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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction

over

this

appeal

pursuant to sections 35-1-82,53(2), 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16, Utah
Code Ann- 1953, as amended.
II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Did the Industrial Commission ("Commission") correctly

determine and apply the lent employer doctrine to the facts in this
matter to determine that BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") was the
sole employer of Robert T. Phillipson ("Phillipson")?
is the employee/employer

If not, what

relationship between Phillipson, Mark

Bundy ("Bundy") and BB & B?
B.

Was

the

Commission

required

to

accept

the

parties'

stipulated conclusion of law that BB & B was Phillipson's statutory
employer?
C.

Assuming that BB & B was Phillipson/s statutory employer

and Bundy was Phillipson's general or common law employer, is the
Uninsured Employers' Fund

("UEF") liable for a portion of the

benefits awarded to Phillipson under section 35-1-107, Utah Code
Ann., as amended in 1988?
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review to be applied in the review of all
issues outlined above is the correction of error standard.

The

Court is to review the administrative agency's conclusions of law
1

without deference to determine whether the agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law.1
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The UEF hereby adopts the statement of the case contained in
the Brief of Petitioner.
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Industrial Commission of Utah adopted the findings of fact
made by the administrative

law judge with the addition of one

additional finding: that "Phillipson was performing the work of BB
& B on the date of his fatal industrial accident."
Two

contracts

detail

the

agreement

Phillipson and Bundy and BB & B.

(R. 275).

between

Bundy

and

BB & B entered into an agreement

to lease a truck and driver from Bundy. (R. 3 29-340) .

Bundy and

Phillipson entered into an agreement that Phillipson would work
driving Bundy's truck for BB & B. (R. 354-356).
BB & B and Bundy entered a Lease Agreement which provided that
BB & B would lease a truck and driver from Bundy.
Agreement provided, inter

alia.,

The Lease

that the trucks leased to BB & B

were to be "engaged exclusively in the service of the Lessee [BB &
B] , and that "the goods transported therein shall be transported
pursuant

to the direction

of and under

1

exclusive

control

and

Section
63-46b-16(4)(d),
Utah
Code Ann.; Morton
International vs. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Mor-Flo Industries vs. Bd. of Review, 817
P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991).
2

supervision of Lessee [BB & B ] " .

(R. 329).

The Lease Agreement further provided that "Lessee [BB & B]
shall the complete care, custody and control of both the leased
equipment and the drivers furnished therewith..."

(R. 330).

The agreement then goes on to state that Bundy had

exclusive

responsibility for "hiring, setting the wages, hours and working
conditions

of

and

adjusting

the

grievances

of,

training, disciplining and firing of all drivers"
the equipment.

supervising,

and maintaining

(R. 330).

Under the section of the Lease Agreement titled "Maintenance
and Compliance Requirements,"

paragraph F provides:

(F) as part of its responsibilities hereunder, Lessor
[Bundy] shall furnish to Lessee [BB & B] a list of
Lessor's
qualified
drivers
and
any
supporting
documentation relating thereto that Lessee may, from time
to time, reasonably request. Lessee is hereby granted
the right to request Lessor not to use any particular
driver and, upon such request from Lessee, Lessor shall
comply therewith.
(R.

331).

This

paragraph

effectively

removes

any

real

responsibility Bundy may have under the agreement to hire and fire.
Paragraph 6 of the Lease Agreement provides that "Lessor shall
furnish to Lessee, as soon as is practical following the completion
of [each individual trip], the following documents and information:
(A) Lessee's over-the-road trip report.
(B) signed delivery receipts and receipted bills of
lading'
(C) current driver's chauffer's [sic] license and medical
certificate;
(D) driver's logs . . .
(E) mileage report . . .
(F) original fuel tickets and state fuel reports (which
are to be executed in the name of Lessee [BB & B ] ;
(G) copies of local, state or federal inspection and
violation notices,
3

(H) detention time records . . •
(I) such pretrip or other vehicle inspection report as
may be required by the ICC or DOT
With respect to said inspection reports, Lessee [BB & B]
reserves the right to prescribe the form on which such
inspections are to be reported. . . .
(R. 3 32) . In paragraph 10 of the Lease Agreement BB & B agreed to
provide Workers' Compensation Insurance,

(R. 3 33) .

The Lease

Agreement further provides that BB & B shall have "the exclusive
care custody and control of the Leased Equipment" and that "all
load must be approved, booked and billed through the Salt Lake
office, NO EXCEPTIONS." (R. 335). BB & B required all drivers to
call and check in before 10:00 a.m. Mountain Standard Time each
Monday through Friday while a Lessor is on dispatch.
be assessed a $50.00 fine.

(R. 335).

Violators to

Other provisions of the

Lease Agreement deal with the procedure for obtaining an advance
on

a

load

paperwork.

and

the

requirement

a dispatch

number

on

the

Again, violators will be assessed $30.00 for each bill

of lading not so marked.
The

for

Independent

(R. 3 3 6)

Contractor

Agreement

between

Bundy

and

Phillipson provided that Phillipson was hired to receive dispatches
from BB & B transportation.
provided

that

the

parties

(R. 3 54).
intended

independent contractor relationship.

to

This agreement further
create

an

"employer-

Owner is interested only in

the results to be achieved, and the methods, means, manner, and
conduct

of

contractor.

the

work

will

be

under

(R. 355).

4

the

sole

control

of

the

VI.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence in the record shows that BB & B maintained the
right to supervise and

control

both Bundy and

Phillipson

and

actually did so. Although Bundy was granted the right to supervise
and control all drivers pursuant to his agreement with BB & B, his
agreement with Phillipson relinquished those rights and purported
to create an employer-independent contractor relationship. Bundy / s
right to control was further eroded by additional language in the
Lease Agreement between BB & B and Bundy which set out the extent
of control that BB & B had the right to exercise with regard to the
drivers of Bundy's trucks.

The agreement also provided that BB &

B would provide workers' compensation insurance for the drivers.
Even if the Court determines that the Industrial Commission
misconstrued the lent employer doctrine giving rise to employer
liability on the part of Bundy and BB & B, the Uninsured Employers1,
Fund is not liable to pay benefits in this matter.
If BB & B is a statutory employer as it asserts, it will have
no effect on the outcome of this case as decided by the Commission.
An employee may have more than one employer under Utah law.

If

there is one employer who is insured or insolvent, UEF liability
does not arise.
arises

when

the

Section 3 5-1-107 provides that UEF
employer

is

liable

insolvent or unable to pay them.

to

pay

liability

benefits, but

is

In this case, BB & B was one of

Phillipson's employers and BB & B was insured.

Section 35-1-107

does not require the UEF to pay benefits in this matter.
5

ARGUMENT
This brief will address the issues in a different order than
the petitioner's brief.
did

not

deal

Therefore,

we

The Commission's decision in this matter

with

the

will

first

interpretation
discuss

the

of

section

several

35-1-107.

approaches

to

determining the employer/employee relationship between Phillipson,
Bundy and BB & B and then address the proper construction of
section 35-1-107.
A.

THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT
BUNDY LOANED PHILLIPSON TO BB & B AND THAT
PHILLIPSON WAS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE DIRECTION
AND CONTROL OF BB & B.
1. PHILLIPSON WAS A LOANED EMPLOYEE WORKING
UNDER THE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF BB & B.

The evidence in the record shows that Bundy hired Phillipson
for the sole purpose of driving a truck for BB & B.
Phillipson

entered

into

Contractor

Agreement."

a
The

contract
agreement

styled

an

clearly

Bundy and

"Independent
provides

that

Phillipson will receive dispatches from BB & B and that Phillipson
was responsible for determining the "methods, means, manner and
conduct of the work."

(R. 355).

The Independent Contractor Agreement further provides that the
parties intended the agreement to set up an employer-independent
contractor arrangement, and provides that the Owner will supply the
truck and trucking equipment, licensing, insurance on the truck and
all regular and extended maintenance on the truck.

(R. 355-356).

The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provides that
6

Bundy will lease trucks and drivers to BB & B for the exclusive
of BB & B.

use

(R. 329-33 0) . The Lease Agreement vests the "complete

care, custody and control of both the leased equipment and drivers
furnished therewith" to BB & B.

This provision of the Lease

Agreement is consistent with the rules of the Utah Public Utility
Commission which provide that a carrier using leased equipment with
a

driver

furnished

possession,

by the lessor must

control, and use

"provide

for

of equipment, and the

exclusive
complete

assumption of responsibility by the lessee."2
The Lease Agreement does provide that Bundy is responsible to
hire, set wages, hours and working conditions, adjust grievances,
supervise, train, discipline, and fire all drivers, in addition to
paying all operating and related expenses for the leased equipment.
(R. 33 0).

However, BB & B maintained strict control over which

drivers could be used and the manner and type of reports to be
filed.

(R. 329-333, 335-336, 338).

In Paragraph ten of the Lease Agreement, Bundy and BB & B
apportioned responsibility for providing insurance coverage.
Lease Agreement provides that BB & B will procure
policies

of

insurance

to

cover

personal

The

and

maintain

injury,

workers'

compensation insurance, property damage and damage to cargo. Bundy
agreed to provide public liability and property damage insurance
and all risk cargo insurance.

(R. 333).

Thus, the arrangement between Bundy and BB & B was for Bundy

2

R746-350-2.M.l.a.ii, U.A.C. (1994).
7

to provide trucks and drivers to work under the supervision and
control of BB & B.

Although Bundy was delegated the tasks of

hiring, firing, setting wages, etc,, BB & B actually

controlled the

details of the work performed by Bundy and Phillipson by telling
them where and when to go, requiring them to report in each day at
a particular time, and by reserving the right to terminate any
driver,

(R. 329-332, 335-336),

In Kinne vs. Industrial Commission3, the Utah Supreme Court
apparently adopted Larson's three pronged test4 for determining
whether a borrower of an employee is a special servant.
When a general employer lends an employee to a
special employer, the special employer becomes liable for
workmen's compensation only if:
(a) The employee has made a contract of hire,
express or implied, with the special employer;
(b) The work being done is essentially the work of
the special employer;
(c) The special employer has the right to control
the details of the work.
When all three of the above conditions are satisfied
in relation to both employers, both employers are liable
for workmen's compensation.
Employment may also be "dual," in the sense that,
while the employee is under contract of hire with two
different employers, his activities on behalf of each
employer are separate and can be identified with one
employer or the other. When this separate identification
can clearly be made, the particular employer whose work
was being done at the time of injury will be held
exclusively liable.
1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation, (1993) § 48.00, p. 8-434.
The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that there

3

609 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1980)

4

Blessing vs. T. Shriver & Co. , 228 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Super.
1967) .
8

was an express or implied contract of hire between Phillipson and
BB & B.

Phillipson's contract with Bundy clearly stated that

Phillipson would receive dispatches from BB & B.

Further BB & B

had the right to fire Phillipson.
Phillipson was hired to drive a truck for BB & B, under the
exclusive direction and control of BB & B.

Phillipson contracted

with Bundy to perform trucking and truck driver services for BB &
B. Therefore, the work performed by Phillipson was exclusively for
the benefit of BB & B.
Finally, BB & B clearly retained the right to direct and
control the work of drivers leased from Bundy. BB & B retained
exclusive responsibility to dispatch all loads hauled in Bundy's
trucks and prescribed call in and reporting procedures for the
drivers.
BB

& B agreed

to

provide workers

compensation

insurance

coverage for the drivers and should be held to its bargain with
Bundy.

This

result

is

consistent

with

the

requirements

for

employers who lease employees as an employee leasing company under
35-1-42(4)(a)

and

is

consistent

with

the

statutory

employer

requirement of the Workers' Compensation Act.
2. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT BB & B
AND BUNDY WERE ENGAGED IN A JOINT ENTERPRISE
FOR MUTUAL PROFIT,
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "joint venture" as:
a legal entity in the nature of a partnership engaged in
the joint prosecution of a particular transaction for
mutual profit•
An association of persons jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise. It requires a
community of interest in the performance of the subject
matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in
9

connection therewith, and duty which may be altered by
agreement, to share both in profit and losses.
A one time grouping of two or more persons in a business
undertaking. Unlike a partnership, a joint venture does
not entail a continuing relationship among the parties.
A joint venture is treated like a partnership for Federal
income tax purposes.
H.C. Black,

Black's Law Dictionary (1983).

Although Bundy and BB & B shared the proceeds of the loads
hauled, they did not share equally in determining how the business
was run as would

participants

in a true joint venture.

The

evidence in the record before the Industrial Commission does not
support the conclusion that Bundy and BB & B were engaged in a
joint enterprise for mutual gain.
The cases

cited

by the Petitioner

in support

conclusion are not relevant to the case at hand.

of

such a

The parties in

Cook vs. Peter Kiewit & Sons5 did not dispute that they were engaged
in a joint venture.

The parties in Aragon vs. Clover Club Foods6

were a parent company and subsidiary.

The Court determined that

the two entities constituted an employing unit analogous to a joint
venture creating tort immunity for the parent company, Bordon. Id.
at 255, 256.
Bundy entered into a contract with BB & B to supply them with
trucks and drivers.

Such an arrangement is not a joint venture

where Bundy relinquished

the right to control both trucks and

drivers to BB & B and had no voice in how the business should be

5

386 P.2d 616 (Utah 1963).

6

857 P.2d 250 (Ct.App. 1993).
10

run.
3.
Section
liability

in

BB & B COULD HAVE BEEN THE STATUTORY
EMPLOYER OF BUNDY AND PHILLIPSON.

35-1-42(6), Utah Code Annotated, creates
a

general

contractor

who

contracts

employer
with

a

subcontractor to perform work which is a part or process of the
contractor's trade or business while retaining supervision and
control over the subcontractor and his employees.
The facts in this case could give rise to statutory employer
liability for workers' compensation benefits on the part of BB & B.
Bundy entered into a contract to supply trucks and drivers to BB &
B.

The contract specified that BB & B retained the right to

control both trucks and drivers, and, in fact, did so.

Finally,

the work performed by Bundy's drivers was truck driving, a type of
work that is clearly part and process of the trucking business.
Although the Commission could have accepted the stipulation of
the parties at face value and found BB & B to be Phillipson's
statutory employer, the result with regard to employer liability
would have been the same.

The Commission would have looked first

to BB & B, the statutory employer, for payment of death benefits to
Phillipson's children.
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WOULD HAVE
REACHED THE SAME RESULT HAD IT STRICTLY APPLIED
THE STATUTORY EMPLOYER PROVISION OF THE
UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACTThe Petitioner makes much of the Commission's failure to adopt
the stipulation of the parties that BB & B was the statutory
employer

of

Phillipson.

The

Commission
11

held

BB

& B

solely

responsible for the payment of benefits pursuant to the loaned
employee doctrine.

However, the Commission7s application of the

statutory employer provision of the Workers Compensation Act would
have led to the same result.7
In

Edwards, the Commission

construed

section

35-1-107

to

impose "liability only in those cases where an injured employee's
employer is uninsured and insolvent.

In Utah, an employee may have

more than one employer. . . .The statute must be read in light of that
fact."

Jd. at 3.

Therefore, any error by the Commission in

construing the loaned employee doctrine was harmless.
Section 35-1-42(6) provides:
(a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over
whose work he retains supervision or control, and this
work is a part or process in the trade of business of the
employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him,
all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by
any of these subcontractors, are considered employees of
the original employer.
Thus,

the

statutory

employee/employer
subcontractors
provide

workers'

contractor
insurance

and

for
and

employer

relationship
their

provision

between

employees.

compensation

contractors

The

benefits

creates

idea

of

subcontractors

to provide

an

incentive

who

their

is designed

through

employees

and

an

the
may

for general

to

general
not

have

contractor

employers to obtain proof of insurance from their subcontractors.

7

In the case of Edwards vs. Weather Shield, Case No. 92-1252,
attached at appendix 5, the Commission concluded that where there
was a solvent employer, Weather Shield, and concluded that the
Uninsured Employers'' Fund was not liable for the payment of
benefits.
12

This

provision

provides

a

first

line

of

defense

to

aid

the

Industrial Commission in its efforts to enforce the requirement of
§ 35-1-4 6 that all employers obtain workers compensation insurance
for their employees.

In this case, BB & B did not require Bundy to

provide proof of workers compensation coverage for his employees
and took no action to get out of the contract when he failed to
provide proof of workers compensation insurance.

(R. 374, 387,

396, 402, 403, 404, 409-413).
A statutory employer's liability under § 35-1-42 does not
arise unless he hires an uninsured subcontractor.

The Commission

will go up the chain of subcontractors and contractors until it
finds an insured statutory employer to pay the benefits.

It makes

no sense in the statutory scheme to create a statutory employer to
pay benefits when he hires an uninsured subcontractor, then create
another entity, the UEF, to share in the payment of the benefits.
C. SECTION 35-1-107 MUST BE CONSTRUED IN CONCERT
WITH SECTION 35-1-42. PHILLIPSON HAD AN INSURED
EMPLOYER SO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND IS
NOT LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF BENEFITS IN THIS CASE.
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCFU") asserts that
section 35-1-107, requires the UEF to pay benefits when there is
more than one employer and one of them is uninsured and insolvent.
It is clear from

its decision

in Edwards that the

Industrial

Commission believes that it should look first to the statutory
employer for insurance and payment before liability is placed on
the UEF.
The statutory employer provision of the Workers 7 Compensation

13

Act8 was passed
to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured
subcontractors by imposing ultimate liability on the
presumably responsible principle contractor, who has it
within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass
upon their responsibility and insist upon appropriate
compensation protection for their workers [and] forestall
evasion of [workmen's compensation acts] by those who
might be tempted to subdivide their regular operations
among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment
relations with the workers,...
Bennett vs. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427, 431 quoting
Larson, Workmen's

Compensation

Law,

1C A.

Sections 49.14, 49.15 (1986).

Thus, it is clear that the purpose of the statutory employer
provision of the Workers Compensation Act is to create an employee
employer relationship between subcontractors and their employees
and general contractors and to impose liability on the general
contractor in cases where, as here, the subcontractor failed to
provide insurance as required by law.
The statute creating the UEF,9 supplementing the protection
afforded under the statutory employer provision, provides:
There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The fund
has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers'
compensation benefits to any person entitled to them, if
that
person's
employer
is individually, jointly, or
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is
insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance,
sureties or other security to cover workers compensation
liabilities (emphasis added).

8

Utah Code Annotated, section 35-1-42(6) (1993)

9

Utah Code Annotated, section 35-1-107 (1993).
14

In Utah, an employee may have more than one employer.

In

this case, Phillipson had one employer, BB & B, who was neither
uninsured nor insolvent.

Therefore, because Phillipson's employer

is able to pay worker's compensation benefits, the provisions of
section 35-1-107 are not triggered and the UEF is not obligated to
pay any portion of Phillipson's benefits.
The

Petitioner

makes

much

of

the proximity

of

the

1988

amendments to section 35-1-107 to this Court's decision in Jacobson
vs. Industrial Commission, 738 P.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1987), however,
the amendments to section 3 5-1-107 were made concurrently with
changes to section 35-1-42, the section which defines statutory
employers, and other changes to "clean up" the language in the
statute.

The "new" language of section 3 5-1-107 does not say that

the UEF must pay benefits whenever there is an uninsured

and

insolvent employer. The legislature apparently took "every" out of
3 5-1-107

because

it was

useless

surplusage.

If

the

meaning

suggested by WCFU was intended by the legislature, it could have
easily said so, in § 35-1-42 as well as § 35-1-107.
Instead, the legislature enacted amendments restricting the
application of the statutory employer provision to situations which
go beyond the "customary trade relationship" between a general
contractor and a subcontractor in the construction field, added a
homeowner's

exemption

and

additional

language

regarding

partnerships and corporate officers.

10

Kinne vs. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 926, 928 (Utah

1980).
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The plain language of section 3 5-1-107 when read in context
with the statutory employer provision it is designed to complement,
requires a finding that the Commission should look first to a
statutory employer to pay benefits.

If the statutory employer is

insolvent or uninsured, the UEF should provide payment.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
The Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed in
favor

of

finding

an

employer/employee

workman and one or more employers.

relationship

between

a

The purpose for such liberal

construction is to advance the beneficent purposes of the Act and
provide workers' compensation benefits to injured workers.

This

is the purpose behind the creation of the "statutory employer."
The statutory employer is liable for the payment of benefits when
he hires an uninsured subcontractor.

The idea is to create an

incentive for the statutory employer to require his subcontractors
to provide insurance for their workers.

If a statutory employer

properly polices his subcontractors, he will not need to worry
about being held liable to pay for workers compensation benefits.
If the statutory employer does not police his subcontractors,
he pays the benefits.

A statutory employer who has not fulfilled

his obligation to insure that his subcontractors have insurance
should not be allowed to look to the UEF for relief from a portion
of his obligation.

Such a result will reduce the incentive for the

statutory employer to do his part to make sure that employees have
workers compensation coverage.
16

To hold that the UEF is liable for a portion of every award in
which there is an uninsured subcontractor and an insured general
contractor will dramatically increase the liability of the UEF,
leading

to

increased

assessments

on

the

premiums of every employer in this state.

workers

compensation

This is not the result

intended by the legislature in creating the UEF.
DATED THIS

/?/

DAY OF OCTOBER, 1994.

\Ad£n

Sharon J. Ebien
Uninsured Employers7 Fund
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35-1-39.

Violation of j u d g m e n t s , o r d e r s , d e c r e e s
o r p r o v i s i o n s of a c t — G r a d e of offense.
If any employer, employee or other person violates
any provision of this title, or does any act prohibited
hereby, or fails or refuses to perform any duty lawfully imposed, or fails, neglects or refuses to obey any
lawful order given or made by the commission, or any
judgment or decree made by any court in connection
with the provisions of this title, such employer, employee or other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
1953
35-1-40. E a c h d a y ' s default a separate offense.
Every day during which any person or corporation
fails to observe and comply with any order of the commission, or to perform any duty imposed by this title
shall constitute a separate and distinct offense.
1953
35-1-41.

F u r n i s h i n g information to c o m m i s s i o n
— E m p l o y e r s ' annual report"— Rights
of c o m m i s s i o n — Examination of emp l o y e r s u n d e r oath — P e n a l t i e s .
Every employer shall furnish the commission, upon
request, all information required by it to carry out
the purposes of this title. In the month of J u l y of each
year every employer shall prepare and mail to the
commission a statement containing the following information, viz: The number of persons employed during the preceding year from Jul} 7 1, to J u n e 30, inclusive; the number of such persons employed at each
kind of employment; the scale of wages paid in each
class of employment, showing the minimum and maximum wages paid; and the aggregate amount of
wages paid to all employees; which information shall
be furnished on blanks to be prepared by the commission and furnished employers free of charge upon request therefor. Every employer shall cause such
blanks to be properly filled out so as to answer full}7
and correctly all questions therein propounded, and
shall give all the information therein sought, or, if
unable to do so, he shall give to the commission, in
writing, good and sufficient reasons for such failure.
The commission may require the information herein
required to be furnished to be made under oath and
returned to the commission within the period fixed bv^
it or by law. The commission, or any member thereof, /
or any person employed by the commission for that;
purpose, shall have the right to examine, under oath,:
any employer, his agents or employees, for the pur-i
pose of ascertaining any information which such e m ployer is required by this title to furnish to the com-;
mission. Any employer who, within a reasonable time
to be fixed by the commission and after the receipt of
written notice signed by at least two members of the
commission specifying the information demanded and
served by registered mail, refuses to furnish to the
commission the annual statement herein required, or
who refuses to furnish such other information as may
be required by the commission under authority of this
section, or who willfully furnishes a false or untrue
statement shall be liable to a penalty of not to exceed
$500 for each offense to be recovered in a civil action
brought by and in the name of the commission. All
such penalties when collected shall be paid into the
combined injury benefit fund.
1977
35-1-42.

Employers e n u m e r a t e d and defined —
Regularly e m p l o y e d — Statutory employers.
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and
school district in the state are considered employers under this title.

334

(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in
this title prescribed in Sections 35-1-60 and
35-2-3, the state is considered to be a single employer and includes any office, department
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other instru^ —mentality of the state.
( (2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each personTincluding each public utility and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or
about the same establishment, under any contract of
hire, express or implied, oral or written is considered
an employer under this title. As used in this subsection:
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in
the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion
of the year.
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance of any work for
another who, while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of
the employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in
accordance with the employer's design.
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing
arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, Employee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is considered the employer of leased employees and
shall secure workers' compensation benefits for
them by complying with Subsection 35-l-46(l)(a)
or (b) and commission rules.
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a
risk showing the leasing company as the named
insured and each client company as an additional
insured by means of individual endorsements.
(c) Endorsements must be filed with the commission as directed by rule.
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered
an employer under this title if:
(i) his employees are all members of his
immediate family and he h a s a proprietary
interest in the farm where they work; or
(ii) he employed five or fewrer persons
other than immediate family members for 40
hours or more per week per employee for 13
consecutive weeks during any part of the
preceding 12 months.
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ
one employee or more t h a n one employee at least
40 hours per week is not considered an employer
under this title.
(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not under this title has the right
and option to come under it by complying with its
provisions and the rules of the commission.
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures
any work to be done wholly or in part for him by
a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and this work is a part or process
in the trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by
any of these subcontractors, are considered ems
ployees of the original employer.
(b) A general contractor may not be considered >
to have retained supervision or control over tne^
work of a subcontractor solely because of the cus~J

tomary trade relationship between general con
tractors and subcontractors
(c) A portion of a construction project subcon
tracted to others may be considered to be a part
or process in the trade or business of the general
building contractor, only if the general building
contractor, without regard to whether or not it
would need additional employees, w ould perform
the work in the normal course of its trade or busi
ness
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence
that he owns or is in the process of acquiring as
his personal residence may not be considered an
employee or employer solely by operation of Sub
section (a)
(e) A partner in a partnership or an o\\ ner of a
sole proprietorship mav not be considered an em
plovee under Subsection (a) if
(1) the person is not included as an em
ployee under Subsection 35 1 43(3)(a) or
(n) the person is included as an employee
under Subsection 35 1 43(3)(a), but his em
ployer fails to insure or otherwise provide
adequate pa>ment of direct compensation,
which failure is attributable to an act or
omission over which the person had or
shared control or responsibility
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e)(n)
(l) a partner of a partnership and an
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed
to have had or shared control or responsibil
lty for any failure to insure or otherwise pro
vide adequate pavment of direct compensa
tion, the burden of proof being on anv person
seeking to establish the contrary, and
(n) evidence affirmatively
est?bhshing
that a partner of a partnership or an owner
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control
or responsibility for any failure to injure or
otherwise provide adequate pavment of di
rect compensation ma> only be overcome bv
clear and convincing evidence to the con
trary
(g) A director or officer of a corporation ma\
not be considered an employee under Subsection
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from cov
erage under Subsection 35 1 43(3)(b)
1993
35 1 43

" E m p l o y e e , " " w o r k e r " or " w o r k m e n "
a n d " o p e r a t i v e " defined — Mining les
sees a n d s u b l e s s e e s — P a r t n e r s a n d
sole p r o p r i e t o r s — C o r p o r a t e officers
and directors — Real estate agents and
brokers
(1) As used in this chapter, 'employee,
worker
or workmen," and "operative" mean
(a) each elective and appointive officer and
any other person, in the service of the state, or of
anv county, city, town, or school district within
the state, serving t h e state, or any county, city,
town, or school district under any election or ap
pointment, or under any contract of hire express
or implied, written or oral, including each officer
and employee of the state institutions of learning
and members of the National Guard while on
state active duty, and
(b) each person in t h e service of any employer,
as defined in Section 35 1 42, who employs one or
more workers or operatives regularly in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied,

oral or written, including aliens and minors,
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but
not including any person whose employment is
casual and not in the usual course of the trade
business or occupation of his employer
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an em
plo3er under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of
mining property and each employee and sublessee of
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar
work The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insur
ance premium for t h a t type of work
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may
elect to include as an employee under this chap
ter any partner of the partnership or the owner of
the sole proprietorship If a partnership or sole
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve
written notice upon its insurance carrier and
upon the commission naming the persons to be
cov ered No partner of a partnership or owner of
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee
under this chapter until this notice has been
given For premium rate making, the insurance
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the
employee to be 150% of- the state's average
weeklv wage
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any
director or officer of the corporation as an em
plovee under this chapter If a corporation makes
this election, it shall serve written notice upon
it^ insurance carrier and upon the commission
naming the persons to be excluded from cover
age A director or officer of a corporation is con
side^ed an employee under this chapter until this
notice has been given
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or workman ' and 'operative' do not include a real
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Sec
tion 6 1 2 2 who performs services in t h a t capacity for
a real estate broker if
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's
or associated broker's income for services is from
real estate commissions,
(b) the services of the real estate agent or asso
ciated broker are performed under a written con
tract specifvmg t h a t the real estate agent is an
independent contractor, and
(c) the contract states t h a t the real estate
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as
an employee for federal income tax purposes
(5) As used m this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or workman," and "operative" do not include an of
fender performing labor under Section 64 13 16 or
64 13 19 except as required by federal statute or reg
ulation
1993
35 1-44 Definition of t e r m s
The following terms as used in this title shall be
construed as follows
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the av
erage week!} earnings arrived a t by the rules
provided in Section 35 1 75
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of
the commission as to t h e amount of compensation
due any injured, or the dependents of any deceased, employee
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and
benefits provided for in this title
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(9) A copy of the physician's initial report shall be
furnished to the commission, the emplo\ee, and the
employer or its insurance carnei
(10) Any physician, surgeon, or other health pro
vider, excluding any hospital, who refuses or neglects
to make any report or comply with this section is
guilty of a class C misdemeanoi for each offense, un
less the commission finds that there is good cause for
submitting a late report
1990
35-1-98. Claims and benefits
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, m
nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee
does not incur medical expenses reasonably related to
the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to
his employer or insurance carrier for pa\ment, for a
period of three consecutive yeais
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total
disability benefits, temporary partial disability bene
fits, permanent partial disabihU benefits or perma
nent total disability benefits is barred, unless an ap
plication for hearing is filed "with the commission
within six years after the date of the accident
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an
application for hearing is filed within one year of the
date of death of the employee
1990
35-1-99, 35-1-100.

Repealed.

198S, 1990

35-1-101.

Attorney general and count} attorneys — Duties.
Upon the request of the commission the attorney
general, or any county attorney, shall institute and
prosecute the necessary actions or proceedings foi the
enforcement of any order of the commission or of any
of the provisions of this chapter, or defend an}' suit,
action or proceeding brought against the commission,
or the members thereof in their official capacity 1979
35-1-102.

E x p e n s e s in a c q u i r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a u thorized.
The commission may make necessary expenditure^
to obtain statistical and other information provided
for herein
1953
35-1-103. Biennial report to g o v e r n o r .
On or before the 1st day of December preceding the
regular session of the Legislature the commission
under the oath of at least two of its membeis, shall
make a report to the governor for the preceding biennial period, which shall include a statement of the
number of aw7ards made by it, and a general statement of the causes of accidents leading to the injuries
for which the awards were made a detailed state
ment of the disbursements from the expense fund,
and the condition of its respecti\e fundb together
v-ith an>' other matters which the commission deems
proper to call to the attention of the governor, including any recommendations it ma}' have to make, and it
shall be the duty of the commission from time to time
to puhhsh -and d\stnb\ito amcmg empVoyeis ai\d employees such general information as to the business
transacted by the commission as in its judgment may
be useful
195j
M-104. Publication of o r d e r s , r u l e s , and rates.
The commission shall cause to be printed, in proper
wrrn for distribution to the public, its orders, classifin les
^\\f'
? ' " R a t i o n s and rules of procedure, and
U furnish the same to any person upon application
J ^ f o r . The expense of such publication shall be auand paid as are other expenses of the commis-

sion The director of finance shall publish the rates
fixed by it for insuiance in the Workers' Compe:nsation Fund of Utah
19SG
35-1-105. Injunction prohibited.
No injunction shall issue suspending or restraining
any order, award, or classification adopted by the
commission, or any action of the state auditor, state
VrrasvrreT, attorney g^sraral W t W -axidYtoT w treasurer of any county, required to be taken by them or
any of them by any of the provisions of this title, but
nothing herein shall affect any right or defense in
any action brought by the commission or the state in
pursuance of authority contained in this title
1953
35-1-106. Partial invalidity — S a v i n g c l a u s e .
Should any section or provision of this title be decided by the courts to be unconstitutional or invalid
the same shall not affect the validity of the title as a
whole or any part thereof other t h a n the part so de
cided to be unconstitutional
1953
35-1-107. Uninsured E m p l o y e r s ' F u n d .
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers'
Fund The fund has the purpose of assisting in the
payment of workers' compensation benefits to any
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is
individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the
benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has
appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to
cover workers' compensation liabilities This fund
succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default
Indemnity Fund If it becomes necessary to pay bene
fits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the em
pi oyer as set forth m Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with
the exception of penalties on those obligations
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall
be provided under Subsection 59-9-101(2) The state
treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its dis
tribution Reasonable costs of administration may be
paid from the fund The commission shall employ
counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund
in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against
or on behalf of the fund Upon the request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or
county attorney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or tiial under this title is pending, or
in which the employee resides or an employer resides
or is doing business, shall aid in the representation of
the fund
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other
benefits paid or payable to or on behalf of an employee oi the employee's dependents from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has
all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employee or
the employee's dependents against the employer failing to make the compensation payments
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory
successor of an insolvent employer is bound by settlem e n t s of covered claims hy. the €vm& T h e court w i t h
jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this
section a priority equal to t h a t to which the claimant
would have been entitled in the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent employer The
expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's expenses.
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the
receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the covered
claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated
claims against the fund which shall preserve the
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rights of the fund for claims against the assets of the
insolvent employer
(6) When any injury or death for which compensa
tion is payable from the Uninsured Employers' Fund
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment, the fund
has the same rights as allowed under Section 35 1 62
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers'
Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission
of Utah, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting
its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting
company, risk management company, insurance com
pany, or other company t h a t has expertise and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensa
tion claims
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the
commission, upon rendering a decision with respect
to any claim for workers' compensation benefits in
which an uninsured employer was duly joined as a
party, shall order the uninsured employer to reimburse the Uninsured Employers' Fund for all benefits
paid to or on behalf of an injured employee by the
Uninsured Employers' Fund along with interest,
costs, and attorneys' fees The commission shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of
15% of the value of the total award m connection with
the claim, and shall direct that the additional penalty
be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund Awards
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter
(9) The liability of the state, the industrial com
mission, and the state treasurer, w ith respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, feeb or
disbursement pioperly chargeable against the fund,
is limited to the assets in the fund, and they are not
otherwise in any way liable for the making of any
payment
(10) The commission may make reasonable lules
for the processing and payment of claims for compensation from the fund
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Un
insured Employers' Fund to pay benefits under this
section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund ma\ assess all other self-insured employers amounts necessary to pay
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to
an insolvency,
(b) the expenses of handling co\ered claims
subsequent to an insolvency,
(c) the cost of examinations undei Subsection
(12), and
(d) other expenses authorized bv this section
The assessments of each self-insured employer
shall be in the proportion that the manual prem i u m of the self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium
of all self-insured employers for the preceding
calendar year Each self-insured employer shall
be notified of his assessment not later than 30
days before it is due No self-insured employer
may be assessed in any year an amount greater
t h a n 2% of t h a t self-insured employer's manual
premium for the preceding calendar year If the
m a x i m u m assessment does not provide in any
one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid as soon as funds become available All self-insured employers are liable under
this section for a period not to exceed three years
after t h e self-insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance privi-
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leges within this state This subsection does not
appl} to claims made against an insolvent self
insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior
to July 1, 1986
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to
notify the industrial commission of any information
indicating that any self insured employer may be in
solvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its
employees or the public Upon receipt of t h a t notifica
tion and with good cause appearing, the industrial
commission may order an examination of that self
insured employer The cost of the examination shall
be assessed against all self-insured employers as pro
vided m Subsection (11) The results of the examina
tion shall be kept confidential
(13) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' Fund, or by or on behalf of the
emplovee to whom oi to whose dependents compensa
tion and other benefits are paid or payable from the
fund, the burden of proof is on the employer or other
party in interest objecting to the claim The claim is
presumed to be valid up to the full amount of
workers' compensation benefits claimed by the employee or his dependents This subsection applies
whether the claim is filed m court or in an adjudica
tive proceeding under the authority of the commis
sion
(14) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a
sole proprietorship ma> not recover compensation or
other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund
if

(a) the person is not included as an employee
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), or
(b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his employer
fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate pay
ment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or omission over which the
person had or shaied control or responsibility
(15) For purposes of Subsection (14)(b)
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of
a sole proprietorship are presumed to have had or
shared control or responsibility for any failure to
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of
direct compensation, the burden of proof being on
any person seeking to establish the contrary, and
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a
partner of a partnership or an owner of a sole
proprietorship had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation
may only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary
(16) A director or officer of a corporation may not
recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is
excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-143(3)(b)

35-1-108.

1990

M a n a g e d health care — Health c a r e
cost containment.
(1) Self-insured employers and workers' compensation carriers may adopt a managed health care program to provide employees the benefits of this title,
beginning J a n u a r y 1, 1993 The plan may include one
or more of the following.
(a) (1) A preferred provider program may be
developed so long as the program allows a
selection by the employee of more than one
physician in the health care specialty required for treating the specific problem of an
industrial patient. If a preferred provider
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-6600
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA
PHILLIPSON, STEPHEN BURDELL
PHILLIPSON, and JAZMIN DANIELLE
PHILLIPSON, Minor Dependent
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON,
Deceasedvs.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY TRUCKING *
(uninsured), BB & B TRANSPORTATION *
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND *
OF UTAH, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,*
*
Respondents.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER
GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case Nos. 92-926
St 92-1132

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews the
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63
-46b-12.
The minor
dependent
children
of Robert T.
Phillipson
("applicants") filed a claim for workers' compensation death
benefits pursuant to the industrially caused death of their father.
BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") stipulated that it was the
statutory employer of Mr. Phillipson. The administrative law judge
("ALJ") found that the Mark Bundy dba Bundy Trucking ("Bundy") was
Mr. Phillipson 7 s common law or actual employer and ordered that the
liability for the payment of benefits be shared jointly and
severally between Bundy and BB & B. The ALJ ordered that benefits
to be paid initially by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
("WCFU"), BB & B's insurer, with a right to recover 5 0 % of the
benefits paid from Bundy. If Bundy does not have sufficient assets
to pay his 50% portion of benefits, the Uninsured Employers' Fund
("UEF") was ordered to make the payments for Bundy.
Respondent Bundy filed a motion for review asserting that BB
& B was the sole employer of Phillipson and that Phillipson was an
independent contractor to Bundy. The UEF filed a motion for review
of that portion of the order which ordered the UEF to pay benefits
if Bundy is unable to pay his share of the award.
We hereby adopt the findings of fact contained in the
administrative law judge's order of May 6, 1993 with the following
additional finding:
1.
Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of
his fatal industrial accident.
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I- WAS BB & B PHILLIPSON'S SOLE EMPLOYER?
Bundy argues that BB & B was Phillipson's sole employer and,
therefore, solely liable for his workers' compensation benefits.
It appears that the Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B
provides that Bundy lease a truck and loan a driver to BB & B. A
loaned employee may be the employee of either the general employer
or the special employer depending upon the circumstances of the
case.1 According to Professor Larson, the general employer will be
presumed liable unless it can-be shown that the special employer
has been substituted for the general employerTo overcome the
presumption, the evidence must show:
(1) a contract of hire
between the special employer and the employee; (2) proof that the
work being done at the time of injury was essentially the work of
the special employer; and (3) proof that the special employer
assumed the right to control the details of the work. Xd. at 8457.
Utah courts have determined that the right to supervision and
control is the most important factor for determining whether an
employee/employer relationship exists.2 Utah law further provides
that a contract between an employee and special employer may be
implied by conduct of the parties.3
The decedent and Bundy entered into an agreement whereby
decedent
agreed
to
"receiv[e]
dispatches
from
BB
&
B
Transportation." The agreement was entered on January 22, 1991.
The decedent's spouse testified that she took approximately ten
trips with the decedent and that on each of those trips the
decedent was required to report in to BB & B on a regular basis.
The evidence indicates that the decedent regularly drove for BB &
B and agreed to an employee/employer relationship between himself
and BB & B.
The Lease Agreement stated that BB & B was an "irregular route
for hire carrier [with ICC authorization to transport] General
Commodities between points in the Continental United States." The
decedent regularly operated a truck transporting commodities for BB
& B and was doing so at the time of his fatal industrial accident.
Therefore, at the time of his accident, decedent was performing the
work of BB & B and not Bundy.

1

See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 48,00. (1992 Ed.)

2

Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah

1975).
3

Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Utah 1976) •
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The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provided that
Bundy "shall furnish a driver or drivers for each unit of the
Leased Equipment11 and that the Lessee (BB & B) "shall have the

complete
drivers

care, custody
and control
furnished
therewith..."

of both the Leased
(emphasis added).

Equipment
and
The agreement

further provides that Bundy "shall have full and exclusive
responsibility for:
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and
working conditions of and adjusting the grievances of, supervising,
training, disciplining and firing of all drivers..." Thus, BB & B
had the ultimate right to control the decedent's work.
Bundy's
role was either that of a supervisor for BB & B or an employer who
retained some control over his loaned employee. Bundy's failure to
relinquish all control over his loaned employee does not affect the
application of the loaned servant doctrine. 4
BB & B exercised the right to control the loaned employees
that was granted in the Lease Agreement.
BB & B required the
decedent to report to its dispatcher each day before 10:00 a.m.
Mountain Time and to haul only loads that BB & B approved. BB & B
also had the right to refuse to use any driver provided by Bundy.
These factors support the conclusion that BB & B exercised the
right to control the work of the decedent.
The Lease Agreement further provided that BB & B would provide
workers' compensation insurance. 5
Therefore, a preponderance of
the evidence supports the conclusion that decedent was a loaned
employee in the service of BB & B at the time of his fatal
industrial accident. 6
Therefore, the liability for payment of
4

"It has never been held by this Court that for the loaned
servant doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely
surrender all control over his loaned employee."
Bambrough v«
Bethers at 1292.
5

"It is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible for
obligations he assumes by contract."
Kinne v.
Industrial
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980).
6

This case may be distinguished from Kinne v. Industrial
Commission, 609 P. 2d 926 (Utah 1980) , in which both the truck owner
and lessee were held liable for benefits. In Kinne, the employee
was injured while performing truck maintenance, a job which
benefitted both the truck owner and the lessee.
In the present
case, decedent was performing the work of the lessee at the time of
his injury*
The contract in Kinne provided that the lessor would
provide workers' compensation insurance and be responsible for the
direction and control of the drivers. In this case, the contract
provided that the lessee would provide workers' compensation
insurance and retain the ultimate right to direct and control the
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workers' compensation benefits rests solely with BB & B and its
insurance carrier, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
We conclude that decedent was a loaned employee solely in the
service of BB & B at the time of the fatal industrial accident.
Therefore, Bundy and, by extension, the Uninsured Employers' Fund,
are not liable for any portion of the benefits awarded.
We will not address the additional issues raised by the
parties because they are rendered moot by our decision above.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the findings of fact of the
administrative law judge are adopted as amended above.
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
the
order
of
the
administrative law judge dated May 6, 1993 be amended to read as
follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74787-2, which account has as its owner Joshua J.
Newton. No disbursements shall be made from the account
without the written authorization of the Commission upon
a showing of need.
The benefits awarded herein shall
commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate of $77.25
per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum.
The defendants shall deduct
$1,875.00 from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall
remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the
applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74788-0, which account has as its owner Shayla M.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without
the written
authorization
of
the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum

drivers.
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including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Shayla, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74789-8, which account has as its owner Stephen B.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without
the written
authorization
of
the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Stephen, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74790-6, which account has as its owner Jazmin D.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without
the written authorization
of
the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Jazmin, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit
Union mail quarterly statements to the children c/o
Melanie Phillipson, 148 West 100 North, # A - 1 , Nephi, UT
84648.
Mrs. Phillipson shall furnish Mountain America
Credit Union with social security numbers for the
children to facilitate the reporting of interest income,
and she is responsible for filing any required income tax
returns.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, B B & B
Transportation /Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, shall
pay Kevin Sutterfield, Attorney for the applicant, the
sum of $7500,00, for services rendered in this matter,
the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards to the
children as previously provided.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1,
1997, the Workers' Compensation Fund shall
send
Declaration of Dependency forms to Melanie Phillipson
prior to the termination of the benefits awarded to the
children herein.
Thereafter, the children will be
entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death
benefits received by them at that time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED-'that any Motion for Review of
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty
(30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed,
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or
appeal.

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
Any request for reconsideration by the Industrial Commission
must be filed within 2 0 days of the date of this Order. A request
for reconsideration is not required prior to filing an appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals. An appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
must be filed within 3 0 days of the date of this Order.

002

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of JOSHUA J. NEWTON & SHAYLA
MARIA PHILLIPSON, Case Number 92-926 & 92-1132, on fl ^fc^day of
i)U<-^<^-19 9*f to the following:

MELANIE PHILLIPSEN
148 WEST 100 NORTH #A-1
NEPHI, UTAH 84648
KEVIN SUTTERFIELD
P 0 BOX 778
PROVO, UTAH
84603
MARK BUNDY TRUCKING
P O BOX 192
NEPHI, UTAH
846548
STUART WEED
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

SUITE 1800
84111-1004

B B Sc B TRANSPORTATION
P O BOX 7061
MURRAY, UTAH
84107
RICHARD G. SUMSION
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
THOMAS STURDY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
CINDY PETERSON
MOUNTAIN AMERICA CREDIT UNION
P O BOX 45001
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84145
T. C. ALLEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel 7 s Office
Industrial Commission of Utah

Appendix 4
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

92-926 & 92-1132

KiR"fON, MzCQHKiF
& POELMAW

JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent*
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA
*
PHILLIPSEN, STEPHEN BURDELL
*
PHILLIPSEN, and JAZMIN DANIELLE *
PHILLIPSEN, Minor Dependent
*
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN,*
Deceased,
*
*

Applicants,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

vs.

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY
TRUCKING (UNINSURED) , B B & B
TRANSPORTATION and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*

AND ORDER

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22,
1993, at 1:00 o'clock p.m.; same being pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicants were represented by Kevin Sutterfield,
Attorney at Law.
Defendant, Mark Bundy was present and represented by
Stuart Weed, Attorney at Law.
Defendant, B B & B Transportation was represented by
Irene Warr, Attorney at Law.
The defendant, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
was represented by Richard G. Sumsion, Attorney at
Law.
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented
Thomas C. Sturdy, Attorney at Law.

by
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge.
Being
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is
prepared to enter the following

FINDINGS OF FACT:
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through counsel, notified the
Administrative Law Judge that it and its insured, B B & B
Transportation, were stipulating that B B & B Transportation was
the statutory employer of the decedent, Robert T. Phillipsen, In
light of the Stipulation, the litigation of the statutory employer
issue was thus rendered moot. However, there remains an issue with
respect to whether or not B B & B Transportation, in addition to
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his sole
employer. Dispositive Motions had previously been filed by the
parties, which were taken under advisement pending -the conclusion
of the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the issues have been well
briefed. As will appear from the discussion which will follow, the
Administrative Law Judge found and concluded that the decedent, Mr.
Phillipsen, had two employers at the time of his death, his common
law or actual employer, Mark Bundy, and his statutory employer,
B B & B Transportation.
The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was driving a truck
owned by Bundy Trucking and leased to B B & B Transportation when
he was involved in a fatal industrial accident on May 10, 1991. At
the time of his death, there were four minor children living in his
home, who were dependent upon him for support, namely, Joshua J.
Newton, (DOB: 2-22-85), Shayla Marie Phillipsen, (DOB: 7-15-86),
Stephen Burdell Phillipsen, (DOB: 4-7-88), and Jazmin Danielle
Phillipsen, (DOB: 1-17-92).
The decedent was also married to
Melanie Phillipsen, who was living with him at the time of his
death. Melanie Phillipsen filed a claim for workers compensation
benefits with the Industrial Commission on August 3, 1992.
Thereafter, the Uninsured Employers Fund, by and through counsel,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Mrs. Phillipsen's claim on the grounds
that she did not file the same within one year of the decedent's
date of death as required by §35-1-98. The Administrative Law
Judge in a letter Order of November 16, 1992, granted the Motion to
Dismiss on behalf of the Uninsured Employers Fund as to Melanie
Phillipsen. However, the Administrative Law Judge also found that
the effects of §35-1-98, are tolled by §78-12-36, with respect to
the minor dependent children of the deceased. No appeal Jaaving
been taken of that Order, that Order is now the final award of the
Commission.
Based on that Order, the claim was styled as is
presently provided.
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At the time of his death, the decedent was averaging $1,978
per month in wages. Based on the foregoing, the dependents of the
deceased would be entitled to a base compensation award of $3 05.00
per week when rounded to the nearest whole dollar.
When the
dependents allowance is added to the award, the applicants are then
entitled to the maximum award provided by law of $309.00 per week.
Since there are four dependents of the deceased, each child shall
be entitled to an award of $77.25 per week. The benefits to be
awarded to the minor dependents shall be placed in trust accounts
at the Mountain America Credit Union, and shall be disbursed only
upon a written showing of need. Upon reaching the age of eighteen,
the balance found remaining in each account shall become the sole
property of that child. The total award for the initial six years
shall be $96,408.00, which would entitle each child to an award of
$24,102.00 for the first six years of benefits.
As intimated earlier, the remaining issues in this case
involve whether or not the applicant was the sole employee of
B B & B Transportation, and if not, if the Uninsured Employers Fund
is jointly and severally liable along with Mr. Bundy and the
statutory employer, for the benefits in this case. The defendant,
Mark Bundy, points to the Lease Agreement as between himself and
the defendant, B B & B Transportation as support for his position
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer, in fact, of the
applicant. As a related issue, Bundy also argues that because of
Exhibit D-3, which is an Independent Contractor Agreement between
Bundy and the deceased, Bundy urges that the applicant was also an
independent contractor.
That Agreement in its Recital section indicates that the
contract is being made between the owner, Mark Bundy, and Mr.
Phillipsen, who is denominated as a contractor.
The Recital
section indicates that the owner owns certain trucks and trucking
equipment and operates a truck ownership business and that he
desires Phillipsen as the contractor, to perform the services of
trucking and truck driving.
For these services, the Agreement
provides that the decedent would receive 2 0% of the revenue
generated by the load taken, and that he would receive dispatches
from B B & B Transportation. The Agreement in its "Relationship
of Parties" section states the following provision: "The parties
intend this contract to create an employer - independent contractor
relationship." The Agreement concludes that the decedent would
hold Bundy harmless from any and all liability for workers
compensation or any other liability which might be subsequently
imposed on Bundy.
This particular provision of the contract
appears to be void on its face since it would appear to run
contrary to the provisions of §35-1-90, Utah Code Annotated. That
section provides that: "No agreement by an employee to waive his
rights to compensation under this title shall be valid."
The
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Agreement goes on to provide that Bundy will supply the truck and
equipment, and will provide for all maintenance for the equipment.
In reviewing the Agreement and the evidence on the file, it
would appear that there was no negotiation of the various terms of
that Agreement. It would further appear that the parties did not
possess equal bargaining power, in that Bundy owned the truck,
while the only asset that Phillipsen possessed was his ability to
drive truck.
This issue of the effect of an independent contractor
agreement executed by a driver has been previously addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons v.
Ashton, P2d 316 (Utah 1975) .
In the Ashton case, the Court
addressed the legal effect of an "Independent Contractor Agreement"
similar to that executed by Bundy and the decedent in this matter.
There the Court indicated:
It should be had in mind that the issue is not
whether Dennis A. Ashton was an employee of
Young in the dictionary sense, nor is it to be
determined
solely
from
the terms used.
Particularly, its character is not necessarily
fixed by the fact that the agreement recites
that it is not an employer - employee
relationship, but is that of an independent
contractor.
The question of entitlement to
workman's compensation depends on whether the
facts and circumstances bring him within the
requirements of the Workmens Compensation Act.
The applicable statutory provision which governs this case is
found in §35-1-42 (5)(a), which provides:
*

5) (a)

*

*

If any person who is an employer procures
any work to be done wholly or in part for
him by a contractor over whose work he
retains supervision or control, and this
work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor,
all
persons
employed
by
him,
all
subcontractors under him, and all persons
employed by any of these subcontractors,
are considered employees of the original
employer.
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Section 42, in subsection (2) (b) defines the term independent
contractor:
"Independent contractor" means any person
engaged in the performance of any work for
another who, while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job-or piece of work, and is
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a
result in accordance with the employer's design.
The Court in Ashton went on to state:
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as
directed by the employer and who is subject to
a comparatively high degree of control in
performing those duties.
In contrast, an
independent contractor is one who is engaged
to do some particular project or piece of
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do
the job in his own way, subject to only
minimal restrictions or controls and is
responsible
only
for
its
satisfactory
completion.
To provide guidance in this area, the Court set forth the
following parameters:
The main facts to be considered as bearing on
the relationship here are: (1) Whatever
covenants or agreements exist concerning the
right of direction and control over the
employee, whether express or implied; (2) The
right to hire and fire; (3) The method of
payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as
compared to payment for a complete job or
project; and
(4) The furnishing of the
equipment. (Citation omitted).
In applying the foregoing legal requirements to the facts of
this case, I find that as the Court found in Ashton, that although
the parties recited in their lease that they had an independent
contractor relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen, had JQO real
choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid 20% of the revenue generated for
the load that he took, and there was no evidence offered to
indicate that he had any negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever
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with respect to that term of the agreement. Further, the truck Mr.
Phillipsen was driving was owned by Mark Bundy.
There was no
provision in the contract whereby Mr. Phillipsen could refuse to
haul a load or an oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr.
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on the truck that Mr.
Phillipsen was driving, so that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a
certain speed limit. With respect to the relationship between Mr.
Bundy and Mr. Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power of
control over the decedent. Although the Independent Contractor
Agreement did not retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that power
in a separate lease agreement he executed in 1990, with B B & B
Transportation.
In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a
driver and was to "have full and exclusive responsibility for. . .
hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and
adjusting the grievances of, supervising, training, disciplining
and firing of all drivers. . . ", 1990 (Lease at 5 3 (A)).
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this case
represents the fact situation anticipated by the Supreme Court when
it made its observation that:
The employer wanted the "best of two possible
worlds."
On the one hand to have a person
rendering a service over whom he can maintain
a high degree of control, and at the same time
give the person the status of an independent
contractor to avoid the responsibilities he
would have to an employee.
Based on the foregoing discussion, I find and conclude that
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy Trucking on May
10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal compensable industrial
accident.
As indicated just previously, there was a separate Lease
Agreement as between Mark Bundy and B B & B Transportation. That
Agreement provided that Bundy, as the owner-operator of certain
trailers and 18 wheel tractors, would furnish that equipment to
B B & B Transportation.
That Agreement provided that B B & B
Transportation would "Have complete care, custody and control of
both the leased equipment and the drivers furnished therewith. . ."
(Lease at 5 3) .
That Agreement also provided that B B & B
Transportation would furnish the general and workers compensation
coverage (Lease at 5 10,) and would require that all drivers check
in with B B & B Transportation before making any trip (Lease at
5 11)• The agreement went on to provide that Bundy would pay all
equipment expenses including fuel, oil, repairs, taxes and license
fees (Lease at f 3 (D) ) . And that Bundy shall: "Have full and
exclusive responsibility for. . . hiring, setting the wages, etc.,
of the drivers." Based on the foregoing provisions of the Lease
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Agreement between himself and B B & B Transportation, Bundy urges
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer of the decedent.
However, by the very terms of his Lease Agreement with B B &
B Transportation, Bundy retained the right of control over the
activities of the decedent, Phillipsen. The surviving spouse of
the decedent testified that she took approximately ten trips with
the decedent and on each of those trips, the decedent was required
to report in to B B & B Transportation on a very regular basis
concerning his whereabouts at all times. The payment arrangement
between the parties was such that B B & B Transportation would pay
Bundy 85% of the revenue generated for the load taken by the
decedent, and Bundy, in turn, would pay Phillipsen his 20% share of
the revenue generated.
Therefore, under the terms of the 1990
Lease Agreement, Bundy had the right of control over Phillipsen,
and he also had the right to hire and fire Phillipsen.
In
addition, Bundy paid Phillipsen7s wages, and he owned and leased
the tractor and trailer used by Phillipsen in the performance of
his duties. Based on these factors, and in reliance on the Supreme
Court decision in the matter of Charles Kinne v. Industrial
Commission, 609 P2d 926 (Utah 1980) , I find and conclude that Mark
Bundy is jointly and severally liable with B B & B Transportation
for the compensation award in this matter. I find, as the Court
did in Kinne, that: "An employee, for the purpose of workmen's
compensation may have two employers."
One final issue involves the relationship of the Uninsured
Employers Fund and whether or not it has liability for benefits in
this matter, since the uninsured employer, Mark Bundy, has been
assessed with joint and several liability. The Uninsured Employers
Fund relies upon its reading of §35-1-107 (1) , to conclude that
they have no liability. Section 35-1-107 (1) , states:
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund.
The Fund has the purpose of assisting in the
payment of workers compensation benefits to
any person entitled to them, if that person's
employer is individually-jointly, or severally
liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is
insolvent, appoints
or has appointed
a
receiver,
or
otherwise
does
not
have
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or
other security to cover workers compensation
liabilities. If it becomes necessary to pay
benefits,
the
Fund
is
liable
for
all
obligations of the employer as set forth in
Title 35, Chapters
1 and 2, with the
exceptions of penalties on those obligations.
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The Uninsured Employers Fund takes the position that it is
only secondarily liable, and that the statutory employer, B B & B
Transportation is primarily liable for benefits, and that the
Uninsured Employers Fund only has liability in the event that the
statutory employer and the uninsured employer are unable to pay
benefits.
That reading of §35-1-107, seems to give no effect
whatsoever to the 1988 amendment to §35-1-107. The 1988 amendment
struck the qualifier every which appeared before employer in §3 5-1107. In the pre-1988 version of §107, the Act provided that the
Uninsured Employers Fund had no liability unless every employer of
the applicant was insolvent. The Legislature in the 1988 amendment
specifically removed the word every from that statute. I can only
conclude that the intent of the Legislature in removing the word
every was to overcome the effects of the decision in Jacobsen v.
Industrial Commission, 738 P2d 658, (Utah 1987).
In that case, the Uninsured Employers Fund and the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah litigated whether or not every employer
of the applicant had to be insolvent before the Uninsured Employers
Fund would have liability. In that case, the Court found that the
term every meant what it said, and, as such, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah was assessed liability in that case,
since only the uninsured employer was insolvent. The Administrative Law Judge can only presume that in order to overcome the
ruling in the Jacobsen case, the Legislature, in its infinite
wisdom, removed the requirement that every employer be insolvent
before Uninsured Employer Fund liability would be triggered. To
adopt the position of the Uninsured Employers Fund which was urged
at hearing, would mean that the Administrative Law Judge by
administrative fiat and decision would repeal the 1988 amendment to
§3 5-1-107. That step this Administrative Law Judge will not take.
Therefore, I find that based on my reading of §35-1-107, it would
appear that the Uninsured Employers Fund has joint and several
liability with the statutory employer upon the uninsured employer
being unable to pay benefits in a case.
Applying the foregoing reasoning to this case, I find that the
death benefits to be awarded to the minor dependents shall be paid
in the first instance by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, and
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall be entitled to 50%
reimbursement from Mark Bundy. In the event Mark Bundy is without
sufficient assets or surities to pay his portion of the award, then
the Uninsured Employers Fund, pursuant to §107 of the Act, shall
then step in and make the payments in Bundy's stead.
The applicants herein, have had the benefit of legal counsel
in these proceedings. As a result, counsel is entitled to_a fee
for his services. The attorneys fee rule provides that the maximum
fee payable on a workers compensation case is $7,500.00. Based on
the amount recovered for the applicants, counsel is entitled to the
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maximum fee. That fee shall be deducted equally from each of the
applicant's benefits, which will result in a deduction of $1,875.00
from each child's accrued award.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy dba Mark
Bundy Trucking on May 10, 1991,-when he sustained his fatal
industrial accident.
In addition, Robert T. Phillipsen was a
statutory employee of B B & B Transportation on May 10, 1991, when
he sustained his fatal industrial accident. B B & B Transportation
and Mark Bundy are jointly and severally liable for the death
benefits due and owing to the applicants as the result of the
industrial accident sustained by Robert T. Phillipsen on May 10,
1991, during the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to
§35-1-107, the Uninsured Employers Fund is jointly and severally
liable with the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah for death
benefits in this matter in the event, Mark Bundy is insolvent or
lacks sufficient assets or sureties to satisfy his portion of the
award in this matter.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74787-2, which account has as its owner, Joshua J. Newton. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74788-0, which account has as its owner, Shayla M. Phillipsen. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about-May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
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from the accrued award to Shayla, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102,00, for deposit in share account
#74789-8, which account has as its owner, Stephen B. Phillipsen.
No disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77,25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Stephen, and shall remit the same to
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services
rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74790-6, which account has as its owner, Jazmin D. Phillipsen. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Jazmin, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit Union mail
quarterly statements to the children c/o Melanie Phillipsen, 148
West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT 84648,
Mrs. Phillipsen shall
furnish Mountain America Credit Union with social security numbers
for the children to facilitate the reporting of interest income,
and she is responsible for the filing of any required income tax
returns.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mark Bundy and/or
B B & B Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, the sum of
$7,500.00, for services rendered in this matter, the same to be
deducted from the aforesaid awards to the children as previously
provided.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1, 1997, the
Workers Compensation Fund shall send
Declaration of Dependency
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forms to Melanie Phillipsen prior to the termination of the
benefits awarded to the children herein. Thereafter, the children
will be entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death benefits
received by them at that time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall
be paid in full in the first instance by the Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah. The Workers Compensation Fund shall thereafter be
entitled to reimbursement for 50% of the benefits paid in this
matter from Mark Bundy on a quarterly basis. In the event Mark
Bundy is without sufficient assets or sureties or is insolvent and
is therefore unable to pay his 50% portion of the benefits in this
matter, then the Uninsured Employers Fund shall make those payments
for Bundy, and they shall reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund
of Utah on a quarterly basis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.
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Timothy C/. /Allen
Presiding Administrative Law Judge

Cert;if ied this 6 •- .day of
May, 1993.
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P. 0. Box 192
Nephi, UT 84648
Stuart Weed
Attorney at Law
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
SLC, UT 84111-1004
B B & B Transportation
P. 0. Box 7061
Murray, UT 84107
Thomas Sturdy
Attorney at Law
Uninsured Employers Fund
Richard G. Sumsion
Attorney at Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P. O. Box 57929
SLC, UT 84157
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

r

IJUUL>SY\&
f^Ai\
Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division

iTi\^/f\yr\

Appendix 5
Edwards vs. Weather Shield, et al.
Case No. 92-1252

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
THOMAS M. EDWARDS,

*
*
*

Applicant,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
RONALD E. MILLER; WEATHER
SHIELD TRANSPORTATION, LTD.;
HOME INSURANCE; and UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS FUND,
Defendants.

Case No. 92-1252
•k

*
*
*

In this matter, the Administrative Law Judge awarded workers'
compensation benefits to Thomas M. Edwards.
The ALJ then
apportioned
liability
for those benefits among the
various
defendants:
Ronald Miller, Edwards' common law employer, who is
uninsured; Weather Shield, Edwards' statutory employer, and its
insurance carrier, Home Insurance, (referred to collectively as
"Weather Shield11 hereafter) ; and the Uninsured Employers' Fund
("UEF").
The parties agree that Edwards is entitled to workers'
compensation benefits. However, UEF has filed a timely Motion For
Review, arguing it should not be held liable for any part of those
benefits.
After UEF filed its Motion For Review, Miller and
Weather Shield filed their respective Responses.
As part of its
Response, Weather Shield not only replied to UEF's Motion For
Review, but also argued that it is not Edwards' statutory employer.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the
A L J / s Order. The following is a summarization of those facts.
Miller employed Edwards to drive one of Miller / s trucks.
Miller then leased the truck and driver to Weather Shield.
Under
the
lease agreement,
Weather
Shield
assumed
and
exercised
substantial control over Edwards 7 work.
Edwards was .injured while driving the truck and suffered
medical expenses and disability.
At the time of the accident,
Miller thought he had obtained workers' compensation coverage for
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Edwards through Thresherman's Insurance.
However, Thresherraan's
subsequently denied responsibility for Edwards' injuries. 1

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The issues before the Commission are Weather Shield's status
as Edward's statutory employer and UEF's liability for a portion of
Edwards' benefits.
I.

WEATHER SHIELD'S STATUS AS EDWARD'S STATUTORY EMPLOYER.

The ALJ found that Weather Shield was Edward's statutory
employer.
Weather Shield did not contest the ALJ's finding by
filing a Motion For Review.
Instead, Weather Shield raised the
issue for the first time in its Response to UEF's Motion For
Review.
Section 63-46b-12 of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act
allows an aggrieved party 30 days in which to seek review of an
ALJ's decision. Because the 30 day time limit is jurisdictional,
the Commission has no jurisdiction to consider Issues raised after
the 30 day period has expired.
Maverik v. Industrial Com'n, 860
P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993)
In this case, the ALJ issued his decision on May 19, 1993.
Weather Shield did not raise the issue of its status as a statutory
employer until July 20, 1993, approximately 60 days later. Because
Weather Shield did not raise the issue in time, the Commission
lacks jurisdiction to consider it.
The ALJ's conclusion that
Weather Shield was Edwards' statutory employer therefore remains In
effect.
II.

UEF'S LIABILITY FOR A PORTION OF EDWARDS' BENEFITS.

The ALJ
concluded
that Miller
did
not have workers'
compensation coverage at the time of Edwards' accident. Based on
that fact, the ALJ ruled that UEF may be liable to pay one-half of
Edwards' benefits, if Miller is insolvent.
In reaching that
conclusion, the ALJ relied upon §3 5-1-107 of Utah's Workers'

1

The Commission is concerned that Thresherman's improperly
denied coverage for Edwards 7 injury. However, because that* issue
is not before the Commission, the Commission must rely upon the
affected parties to take appropriate action to resolve the issue of
Thresherman's liabi1ity.
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Compensation Act, which provides in material part:
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund. The Fund
has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers
compensation benefits to any person entitled to them, if
that person's employer is individually, jointly, or
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is
insolvent . . . .
~—
The Commission disagrees with the ALJ's application of the
foregoing statute. The statute imposes liability on the UEF only
in those cases where an injured employee's employer is uninsured
and insolvent. In Utah, an employee may have more than one
employer, Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 926, 928 (Utah
1980) . In this case, Edwards had two employers; Miller and Weather
Shield. The statute must be read in light of that fact.
While Miller is uninsured and may be insolvent, Edwards has
another employer—Weather Shield.
Weather Shield is neither
uninsured nor insolvent. Therefore, because Edwards' employer is
able to pay workers' compensation benefits, the provisions of §351-107(1) are not triggered and the UEF is not obligated to pay any
portion of Edwards' benefits.
The Commission notes Weather Shield and Miller's arguments
regarding the legislative intent behind amendments to §35-1-107,
but is not persuaded.
The Commission believes that the plain
language of the statute compels the decision reached by the
Commission.
Furthermore, if the Legislature had intended the
extreme result suggested by Weather Shield and Miller, it could
have easily said so, in unambiguous terms.
ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Commission modifies the third
paragraph of the ALJ's Order, found on page twelve of the ALJ's
decision, to read as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall
be paid in full by Home Insurance.
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The Commission affirms the remainder of the ALJ's decision.
Dated this

day of June, 1994.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Colleen S. Coltcm
Commissioner

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
THOMAS M. EDWARDS
PAGE FIVE
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DENNIS MATTHEWS, ESQ.
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MICHAEL E. DYER
P. O. BOX 2465
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